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Abstract
As with the SARS-CoV-1 outbreak in 2003–2004 and the 
MERS outbreak in 2012, there were early reports of frequent 
transmission to healthcare workers (HCW) in the SARS-CoV-2 
pandemic. Our hospital center identified its first COVID-19 
confirmed case on March 9, 2020, in a 6-day hospitalized pa-
tient.  The first confirmed COVID-19 case in a HCW happened 
3 days later, in a nurse with a probable epidemiological link 
related to the first confirmed patient. Our study’s first objec-
tive is to describe and characterize the impact of the first 3 
months of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic on the Centro Hospi-
talar Universitário Lisboa Norte (CHULN). Our second objec-
tive is to report the performance of the CHULN Occupation-
al Health Department (OHD) and the impact of the pandem-
ic on CHULN HCW and its adaptation across national, 
regional, and institutional epidemiological evolution. Over 
the first 3 months, 2,152 HCW were screened (which repre-
sent 29.8% of the total HCW population), grouped in 100 
separate identifiable clusters, each one ranging from 2 to 98 
HCW. The most prevalent profession screened were nurses 
(n = 800; 37.2%) followed by doctors (n = 634; 29.5%). The 
main source of potential infection and cluster generating 
screening procedures was co-worker related (n = 1,216; 
56.5%). A patient source or a combined patient co-worker 
source was only accountable for 559 (26%) and 43 (2%) of 
cases, respectively. Our preliminary results demonstrate a 
lower infection rate among HCW than the ones commonly 
found in the literature. The main source of infection seemed 
to be co-worker related rather than patient related. New pre-
ventive strategies would have to be implemented in order 
to control SARS-CoV-2 spread.
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by S. Karger AG, Basel 
on behalf of NOVA National School of Public Health
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Resumo
À semelhança dos surtos de SARS-CoV-1, em 2003–2004 
e de MERS, em 2012, a pandemia de SARS-CoV-2 apresen-
tou, desde o seu início, relatos de transmissão frequente 
da doença a profissionais de saúde (PS). O nosso Centro 
Hospitalar identificou o seu primeiro caso confirmado de 
COVID-19 a 9 de março de 2020, num paciente hospital-
izado há 6 dias. O primeiro caso de COVID-19 confirmado 
num PS ocorreu 3 dias depois, numa enfermeira com vín-
culo epidemiológico provavelmente relacionado com o 
primeiro paciente confirmado. O primeiro objetivo do 
nosso estudo é descrever e caracterizar o impacto dos pri-
meiros 3 meses da pandemia de SARS-CoV-2 no Centro 
Hospitalar Universitário Lisboa Norte (CHULN). O nosso 
segundo objetivo é relatar o desempenho do Serviço de 
Saúde Ocupacional (SSO) do CHULN em relação ao im-
pacto da pandemia no CHULN HCW e sua adaptação ao 
longo da evolução epidemiológica nacional, regional e in-
stitucional. Durante os primeiros três meses, foram ra-
streados 2.152 PS (o que representa 29,8% da população 
total de PS), agrupados em cem clusters distintos, cada um 
dos quais variando entre 2 e 98 PS. A profissão rastreada 
mais prevalente foi a de enfermeiro (n = 800; 37,2%) se-
guido do médico (n = 634; 29,5%). A principal fonte de 
infecção identificada (simultaneamente, geradora de pro-
cedimentos de triagem de clusters) esteve relacionada 
com outros colegas de trabalho (n = 1.216; 56,5%). Uma 
fonte originada num paciente ou uma fonte combinada 
de paciente e colega de trabalho foram responsáveeis por 
apenas 559 (26%) e 43 (2%) dos casos, respectivamente. 
Os nossos resultados preliminares demonstram uma taxa 
de infecção mais baixa entre os profissionais de saúde do 
que as comumente encontradas na literatura. A principal 
fonte de infecção parecia estar relacionada com colegas 
de trabalho e não com o paciente. Novas estratégias pre-
ventivas deverão que ser implementadas para controlar a 
propagação do SARS-CoV-2 em contexto profissional.
© 2021 The Author(s) Published by S. Karger AG, Basel
on behalf of NOVA National School of Public Health
Introduction
On December 8, 2019, a pneumonia outbreak of un-
known etiology was first identified in Hubei City, Wuhan 
province, China. Chinese CDC reports the occurrence to 
the World Health Organization (WHO) China Country 
Office on December 31, 2019 [1, 2].
WHO names the disease COVID-19, an acronym for 
coronavirus disease 2019, on February 11, 2020 [3]. The 
agent causing the infection was a novel coronavirus des-
ignated SARS-CoV-2 by the Coronavirus Study Group 
[4, 5].
The disease spreads fast across the country and, soon 
after, across the world leading the WHO to declare the 
COVID-19 outbreak as a global health emergency, on 
January 30, 2020 and as a global pandemic on March 11, 
2020. The last time had been in 2009 for the H1N1 influ-
enza pandemic [6, 7]. Infections from SARS-CoV-2 are 
now widespread [8].
SARS-CoV-2 is the seventh coronavirus known to in-
fect humans, the third that can cause severe disease, but 
the first and only human coronavirus with pandemic po-
tential [9–11]. There is an equal likelihood of contagion 
for any person or worker. When we consider healthcare 
workers, namely, the ones dedicated to the diagnosis, 
treatment and care of infected patients, or laboratory pro-
fessionals that directly manipulate biological products 
containing the virus, one could say that they have a spe-
cific risk that bears a higher probability of infection, 
which necessarily determines the need for specialized 
protection measures [12]. Similar to the SARS-CoV-1 
outbreak in 2003–2004 and the MERS outbreak in 2012, 
there were early reports of frequent transmission to 
healthcare workers (HCW), including several with fatal 
outcome [13]. They are expected to be one of the groups 
most exposed to SARS-CoV-2 infection, and surveillance 
of the proportion of seropositive HCW is an important 
indicator of the spread of the virus [14]. 
Our hospital center identified its first COVID-19 con-
firmed case on March 9, 2020, in a 6-day hospitalized pa-
tient. The first confirmed COVID-19 in a HCW happened 
3 days later, in a nurse with a probable epidemiological link 
related to the first confirmed patient. The Occupational 
Health Department (OHD) started its follow-up program 
of risk contacts and suspected cases evaluation that ended 
up with the development of a new dashboard, which allows 
daily reports to each involved department or ward supervi-
sor, hospital directors and Portuguese Health Authority.
The health information system includes the standard-
ization of criteria and the dissemination of data process-
ing methodologies in order to allow the comparison of 
health indicators that will provide information on best 
practices [15, 16]. 
Our goal is to ensure the transparency of the entire 
COVID-19 prevention process in the OHD, fundamental 
for HCW management decisions [17].
Objectives
Our study’s first goal is to describe and characterize the 
impact of the first 3 months of the SARS-CoV-2 pandem-
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ic on the Centro Hospitalar Universitário Lisboa Norte 
(CHULN) quantified in the total number of cases identi-
fied, number of suspected cases officially reported to the 
OHD and their clinical and epidemiological characteris-
tics.
Our second objective is to report the performance of 
the CHULN OHD and the impact of the pandemic on the 
CHULN HCW and its adaptation across national, re-
gional, and institutional epidemiological evolution. 
Materials and Methods
In order to answer our first objective, we developed a cross-
sectional study, involving all 7,220 workers of the CHULN, be-
tween March 11 and June 12. Our inclusion criteria were: (1) being 
a CHULN HCW; (2) with symptomatology suspicion of CO-
VID-19; (3) having a high-risk or low-risk contact with a known 
COVID-19 patient or colleague. No exclusion criteria were listed. 
Participation was voluntary. To meet our second objective, we car-
ried out a narrative analysis of the OHD performance, during the 
evolution of the pandemic, and its adaptation effort by developing 
Table 1. COVID-19 screening results during the first trimester of the pandemic at CHULN
1st month, n (%) 2nd month, n (%) 3rd month, n (%) Total, n (%)
Total exposure screening 1,177 (47.4) 465 (18.7) 510 (20.6) 2,152 (100)
Sex
Women 921 (78.2) 374 (80.4) 395 (77.5) 1,690 (78.5)
Men 256 (21.8) 91 (19.6) 115 (22.5) 462 (21.5)
Occupation
Doctor 397 (33.7) 105 (22.6) 132 (25.9) 634 (29.5)
Nurse 427 (36.3) 182 (39.1) 191 (37.5) 800 (37.2)
Nurse aid 303 (25.7) 118 (25.4) 120 (23.5) 541 (25.1)
Technician 102 (8.7) 37 (8.0) 32 (6.3) 171 (7.9)
Clerk 83 (7.1) 20 (4.3) 25 (4.9) 128 (5.9)
Cleaning staff 17 (1.4) 1 (0.2) 4 (0.8) 22 (1.0)
Other 5 (0.4) 2 (0.4) 6 (1.2) 13 (0.6)
Age, years
Mean 40.9 40.2 40.5 40.6
Standard deviation 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2
Maximum; minimum 20; 70 20; 69 22; 68 20; 70
Source
Unknown 152 (12.9) 70 (15.1) 63 (12.4) 285 (13.2)
Patient 287 (24.4) 105 (22.6) 167 (32.7) 559 (26.0)
Co-worker 684 (58.1) 276 (59.4) 256 (50.2) 1,216 (56.5)
Patient + co-worker 43 (3.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 43 (2.0)
Cohabitant 5 (0.4) 4 (0.9) 8 (1.6) 17 (0.8)
Non-cohabitant family 1 (0.1) 9 (1.9) 8 (1.6) 18 (0.8)
Community 5 (0.4) 1 (0.2) 8 (1.6) 14 (0.7)
Cluster
Total 43 27 30 100
Maximum; minimum per cluster 2; 98 2; 47 2; 85 2; 98
Exposure risk
Symptomatic 353 (30.0) 138 (29.7) 133 (26.1) 624 (29.0)
High risk 365 (31.0) 126 (27.1) 199 (39.0) 690 (32.1)
Low risk 418 (35.5) 181 (38.9) 151 (29.6) 750 (34.9)
Asymptomatic without contact 40 (3.4) 17 (3.7) 12 (2.4) 69 (3.2)
Did not answer 1 (0.1) 3 (0.6) 15 (2.9) 19 (0.9)
OHD action
Active symptom surveillance 461 (39.2) 175 (37.6) 135 (26.5) 771 (35.8)
Negative PCR screening 603 (51.2) 261 (56.1) 332 (65.1) 1,196 (55.6)
Positive PCR screening 60 (5.1) 12 (2.6) 15 (2.9) 87 (4.0)
PCR screening declined 12 (1.0) – 1 (0.2) 13 (0.6)
Asymptomatic without contact 33 (2.8) 15 (3.2) 12 (2.4) 60 (2.8)
Did not answer 1 (0.1) 2 (0.4) 15 (2.9) 18 (0.8)
Portuguese Health Authority 3 (0.3) – – 3 (0.1)
Corrupt data 4 (0.3) 4 (0.2)
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a software application (dashboard) to help gather, process, study 
and provide all data to all relevant partners.
In accordance with the Portuguese Health Authority, ECDC 
and the WHO, we use the following definitions: (i) symptomatol-
ogy suspicious of COVID-19, we [18] included any HCW with at 
least one of the following symptoms: cough, fever, shortness of 
breath, sudden onset of anosmia, ageusia or dysgeusia (additional 
less specific symptoms included headache, chills, muscle pain, fa-
tigue, vomiting and/or diarrhea); (ii) high-risk exposure (close con-
tact), we considered any HCW providing care to a COVID-19 con-
firmed case or handling specimens from a COVID-19 case, with-
out recommended Personal Protective Equipment (or with a 
possible breach of PPE) or having had face-to-face contact with 
any COVID-19 case within 2 m for >15 min [18–20]; (iii) low-risk 
exposure was defined as any healthcare worker providing care to a 
COVID-19 case, or laboratory workers handling specimens from 
a COVID-19 case, wearing the recommended PPE or having had 
face-to-face contact or been in a closed environment with any CO-
VID-19 case within 2 m for <15 min [18–20].
All selected cases whether, self-reported or reported by the 
wards, underwent a detailed medical interview in order to discrim-
inate any associated symptoms and to scrutinize the nature of the 
contact with the aim of classifying the associated infection risk. All 
symptomatic HCW underwent an immediate nasopharyngeal 
swab to determine the presence of SARS-CoV-2 through a Reverse 
Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) test. All 
 asymptomatic high-risk contacts performed a nasopharyngeal 
swab to determine the presence of SARS-CoV-2 through a RT-
PCR 4–5 days after the suspicious contact. All laboratory-positive 
cases begun sick leave and were reported to the national CO-
VID-19 patient registry. All laboratory-negative persons as well as 
all asymptomatic low-risk contacts begun an active daily symptom 
surveillance until the 14th day after the suspected contact and were 
reported to the OHD in case of any symptomatology. Any set of 
HCW being surveyed from one common COVID-19 patient were 
grouped in a cluster. Data were gathered from the CHULN OHD 
digital archive.
Results
Over the first 3 months, 2,152 HCW were screened 
(which represent 29.8% of the total HCW population), 
grouped in 100 separate identifiable clusters, each one 
ranging from 2 to 98 HCW. 
Our screened population (Table 1) had a mean age of 
40.6 years and was composed mainly of females (n = 
1,690; 78.5%). The most prevalent occupations screened 
were nurses (n = 800; 37.2%) followed by doctors (n = 
634; 29.5%) and nurses aid (n = 541; 25.1%). Technicians 
and clerks had a minor impact (n = 171; 7.9% and n = 128; 
5.9%, respectively). 
One relevant fact uncovered was that the main source 
of potential infection and cluster generating screening 
procedures was co-worker related (n = 1,216; 56.5%). A 
patient source or a combined patient co-worker source 
was only accountable for 559 (26%) and 43 (2%) of cases, 
respectively. In 285 of the situations screened (13.2%), no 
source was identified. Familial and community sources 
had residual influence on the cases screened. The relative 
proportions of all variables identified remained constant 
throughout the 3 months of screening.
Risk classification was evenly distributed with an over-
all prevalence of 29.0, 32.1 and 34.9% for symptomatic 
HCW, high-risk and low-risk exposure, respectively.
During this first trimester, 1,283 RT-PCR were pre-
scribed, which diagnosed 87 cases of COVID-19 among 
HCW (6.8%) which represent 4.0% of screened HCW 
and 1.2% of the total HCW. By the end of June, Portugal 
counted 42,171 confirmed cases (about 0.41% of the Por-
tuguese population) [21, 22]. During the course of our 
study, Portugal had a 14-day incidence rate average of 
48.94 per 105 (reaching a 103.4 peek by week 15) [8].
Discussion
The 1.2% infection rate among HCW and the 6.8% of 
positive results obtained from all swabs prescribed in our 
study during the first 3 months of the pandemic were 
considerably lower than the ones found in the literature. 
Wu and McGoogan [2] found an incidence of CO-
VID-19 among HCW of 3.8% (n = 1,716 HCW confirmed 
cases out of 44,672 total confirmed cases). Within the 
same time span, but in a Tertiary Hospital in Wuhan, 
China, Lai et al. [23] found an infection rate of 1.1% (110 
of 9,684) among hospital HCW.
In Lombardy, Italy, one study found 8.8% (n = 
139/1,573) of positive results [24]. Although we could not 
find a concrete regional 14-day incidence rate per 105 
data, by the time of the study, Lombardy was the most af-
fected Italian region [25]. In Verona, a total of 11,890 
specimens collected in a combined mass screening and 
contact tracing strategy targeting close contacts, 238 pos-
itive swabs were obtained, yielding a cumulative inci-
dence of 4.0% [25]. The higher results could be explained 
because Italy reported a much higher incidence of disease 
in the community (128,948 confirmed cases which ac-
count for about 0.2% of the total population) [8].
In a Madrilene hospital 11.6% (n = 791) of all hospital 
HCW tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 (38%) [26]. This 
result is higher than ours because a high 14-day incidence 
rate was observed [8].
In Newcastle, researchers found 14% (n = 240) positive 
tests for HCW [27]. At the Sheffield Teaching Hospitals, 
282 HCW were positive for SARS-CoV-2, which repre-
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sents a 1.65% cumulative incidence out of the 17,000 em-
ployed staff [28].
In the Netherlands, a study involving 1,653 symptom-
atic HCW, 6% (n = 86) had a positive SARS-CoV-2 RT-
PCR test (1%) [29].
In our OHD CHULN, we chose to classify and stratify 
the risk of exposure [18–20] and to identify the most 
probable source of infection rather than to infer the risk 
and source of infection by relying on the characteristics 
of specific HCW activities such as working in the first line 
versus non-first line of care, or working in a COVID ver-
sus non-COVID dedicated ward or ICU, or yet dealing 
directly or not with patients as some of the cite authors 
do [2, 23–29]. By doing so, we found that 56.5% of poten-
tial HCW infection and cluster generating screening pro-
cedures were co-worker related. Regardless of the spe-
cific activity, a patient source or a combined patient/co-
worker source was only accountable for 26 and 2% of 
cases, respectively and in 13.2% of the situations screened, 
no source was identified. As familial and community 
sources had residual influence on the cases screened, our 
data point to the fact that in the first 3 months of pan-
demic in our hospital centre, HCW mainly infecting each 
other during meals, break periods or in locker rooms. 
Since early January, CHULN OHD became involved 
in the adaptation effort to the new reality through: (1) ar-
ticulation with other hospital sectors in the design of a 
contingency plan; (2) development of training and infor-
mation actions for HCW; (3) design and implementa-
tion of a surveillance plan of HCW with exposure to CO-
VID-19 patients and early diagnosis of positive cases; 
(4) identification of HCW considered to have greater sen-
sitivity to the development of disease with greater sever-
ity, that allow ending with a dashboard that help OHD 
managing HCW health and prevention strategies.
Conclusions
Our preliminary results demonstrate a lower infection 
rate among HCW than the ones commonly found in the 
literature. The main source of infection seemed to be co-
worker related rather than patient related. New preven-
tive strategies would have to be implemented in other to 
control SARS-CoV-2 spread.
The generalized use of the software application devel-
oped in our hospital would be beneficial not only to opti-
mize human resources, but also to standardize data upload 
to regional and national authorities and to provide com-
mon ground to scientific pandemic impact comparison.
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